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AN EXCEPTION TO THE NOERR-PENNINGTON
DOCTRINE: CONSPIRACY TO UTILIZE THE
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES TO RESTRAIN TRADE
The Sherman Act forbids conspiracies in restraint of interstate
commerce' and monopolization of or conspiracies to monopolize any
area of interstate commerce.' An important exception to the prohi-
bition of conspiracies aimed at restraints of trade or monopolization was
created by the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.' There the court held that a Sher-
man Act violation cannot be predicated on attempts to influence the
passage or enforcement of laws. The Noerr principle was reiterated
4 years later in United Mine Workers v. Pennington.4  The claim of
immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is frequently invoked
by defendants whose alleged antitrust violations have consisted of
soliciting governmental action.5
In the recent case of Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor
Transp ort Co.,6 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a
district court decision which granted Noerr-Pennington immunity to a
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides in part: "Every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with for-
eign nations is declared to be illegal ......
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) provides in part: "Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ......
3. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
4. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
5. See Association of W. Rys. v. Riss & Co., 299 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 916 (1962); Bracken's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe, 273 F. Supp.
606 (S.D. Ill. 1967); Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers
Ass'n, 272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967); Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.
Tenn. 1967); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa.
1966); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Gray Line N.Y. Tours Corp., 242 F. Supp.
365 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 235 F. Supp.
378 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 196 F. Supp.
724 (S.D.N.Y 1961); however, in two cases the courts rejected the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine as inapplicable to the facts. Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564
(9th Cir. 1964); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 284
F. Supp. 582 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
6. 1967 Trade Cas. 72,298 (N.D. Cal. 1967). rev'd, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.
1970).
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group of defendants who allegedly conspired to restrain trade by in-
fluencing judicial and administrative agencies. The Ninth Circuit's
holding has imposed a significant new limitation on the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine.
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
In 1961 the Supreme Court decided Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,7 a case that was to have far-
reaching effects on subsequent antitrust litigation. In Noerr a group
of trucking companies and their trade association sued under section 4
of the Clayton Act8 for treble damages and injunctive relief against
several railroads, a railroad trade association and a public relations
firm. The plaintiffs charged that the defendants had conspired in vio-
lation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act9 to monopolize and
restrain trade in the long-distance freight hauling business.
The truckers claimed that defendants had retained a public rela-
tions firm to conduct a "vicious, corrupt and fraudulent campaign" de-
signed to encourage the passage of laws detrimental to the trucking
business, to create "an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among
the general public," and to impair the relationships existing between the
truckers and their customers.10 The sole purpose of the defendants'
campaign, it was alleged, was to injure and eventually to destroy the
truckers as competitors." The so-called "third-party technique" was
employed the defendants themselves prepared and funded the publicity
programs while making it appear that these represented the spontan-
eously expressed views of independent individuals and civic groups.
The complaint cited several instances of attempts by the defen-
dant railroads to influence particular legislation. One specifically men-
tioned case of successful lobbying had resulted in persuading the Gov-
ernor of Pennsylvania to veto a bill favorable to truckers.'1
2
The district court ruled in favor of the truckers, and the court
of appeals affirmed.' 3 The Supreme Court reversed on three grounds,
one being the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act:
7. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For a colorful treatment of the effects of lobbying
and its relation to antitrust, see Bendiner, The Engineering of Consent-A Case Study,
REPORTER, Aug. 11, 1955, at 14.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
9. Id. §§ 1-2. (1964).
10. 365 U.S. at 129.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 130.
13. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 155 F. Supp.
768 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3rd Cir. 1959), rev'd 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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To hold that the government retains the power to act in this repre-
sentative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people
cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would im-
pute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activ-
ity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis
whatever in the legislative history of that Act.1
4
It was suggested that construing the Sherman Act to forbid concerted
anticompetitive lobbying would deprive the Government of a valuable
source of information.',
The Court further observed that an important constitutional right
was involved-the right to petition.' 6  As Mr. Justice Black stated,
people have a right "to make their wishes known to their represen-
tatives . . .,"I even though they may have anticompetitive motives,1
8
and even though their representations are misleading or their conduct
unethical. 9
The Court did narrow the scope of its opinion somewhat by
recognizing that:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly
directed toward influencing governmental actions is a mere sham
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.
-20
The holding in Noerr elicited considerable criticism.-1 Neverthe-
less in United Mine Workers v. Pennington,22 decided 4 years after
Noerr, the Supreme Court restated the Noerr principle and extended
it to attempts to influence appointed, rather than elected, officials.
In Pennington the plaintiff mine workers union sued the operators of a
small bituminous coal mine for royalty payments due under a wage
14. 365 U.S. at 137.
15. Id. at 139.
16. Id. at 138. Congress is forbidden from making any law which would abridge
the right of the people "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
17. 365 U.S. at 137.
18. Id. at 138.
19. Id. at 141.
20. Id. at 144 (emphasis added). This has become known as the "sham excep-
tion" to the Noerr doctrine. Note that this statement was dictum as the actions of the
railroads were not held to fall within this exception.
21. See 47 CORNELL L.Q. 260 (1962); 33 RocKy MT. L. REV. 412 (1961); cf.
Note, Attempts to Secure State Legislative Restraints of Competition as a Violation of
the Antitrust Laws, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1957); Note, Appeals to the Electorate by
Private Business: Injury to Competitors and the Right to Petition, 70 YALE L.J. 135
(1960). But see 23 U. PIr. L. REv. 216 (1960).
22. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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agreement. A counterclaim was filed which alleged that the union and
certain large coal mining companies had conspired to restrain and
monopolize commerce in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.23 It was alleged that the aim of the conspiracy was to place great
financial burdens on small, non-unionized mines, thereby making it im-
possible for them to compete.24  One of the acts complained of was
the plaintiffs' successful attempt to convince the Secretary of Labor to
adopt a high minimum wage for employees of contractors selling to
TVA. 25  TVA was urged to curtail its spot market purchases, most
of which were exempt from minimum wage requirements,26 and several
of the large coal companies engaged in a ruinous price-cutting cam-
paign.
27
The district court found the union liable for $90,000 damages,
2 8
and the court of appeals affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed. After a lengthy discussion, the Court con-
cluded that the union was not exempt from liability under the antitrust
laws. 0 The Court went on to say that the lower courts failed to take
proper account of the Noerr case.31 The union's bad purpose in at-
tempting to influence the Secretary of Labor was not in itself enough
to make its actions, though otherwise legal, violative of the antitrust
laws:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct
is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme
itself violative of the Sherman Act.
3 2
The "Bad Purpose" Doctrine
This rule of the Pennington case is entirely inconsistent with the
general rule of conspiracy as enunciated in American Tobacco Co.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
24. 381 U.S. at 660.
25. Id. at 660-61. The Secretary of Labor has the authority to set the mini-
mum wage for employers working on Government contracts at a rate equal to that pre-
vailing in the surrounding area. Walsh-Healey Act, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45
(1964).
26. 381 U.s. at 660-61.
27. Id. at 661.
28. 1961 Trade Cas. 11 70,036 (E.D. Tenn. 1961), afj'd, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir.
1963).
29. 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
30. 381 U.S. at 661-69.
31. Id. at 669.
32. Id. at 670 (emphasis added). Accord, Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F. Supp. 388,
399 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
March 19711 TRADE REGULATION
v. United States33 and many other cases.34  The American Tobacco
case involved a Government prosecution under sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. It was charged that the defendants had fixed
prices and excluded competition in the distribution and sale of tobacco
products. With regard to certain defenses to the conspiracy charge,
the court commented:
It is not the form of the combination or the particular means used
but the result to be achieved that the statute condemns. It is not
of importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful
objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful. Acts done to give
effect to the conspiracy may be in themselves wholly innocent
acts. Yet, if they are part of the sum of the acts which are relied
upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the statute forbids, they
come within its prohibition.3 5
In other words, the general rule of conspiracy is that if individuals or
corporations engage in concerted activities for a bad purpose (e.g.
to restrain trade or monopolize the industry) they are guilty of a
conspiracy even though the means used to effectuate the bad purpose
are legal. The Court in Pennington made no attempt to reconcile
its decision with this principle and the cases supporting it. The only
conclusion that can be reached is that the bad purpose doctrine of
the American Tabocco case does not apply where there is a conspiracy
to restrain trade or monopolize an industry through inducement of
governmental action.
Previous to the Noerr case, the lower courts consistently applied
the bad purpose doctrine and found an illegal conspiracy whenever
defendants joined together to effectuate anticompetitive plans by in-
fluencing the executive, legislative, judicial or administrative branches
of government. In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,3"
for example, the defendants allegedly attempted to block licensing of
potential competitors by intervening in licensing proceedings before
the Civil Aeronautics Board and by carrying on a well-planned cam-
paign of appealing licensing decisions and disseminating false and
misleading propaganda. 7 Although the methods used by the defen-
33. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913); United States v.
Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 351-58 (1912); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,
396 (1905); United States v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459, 464 (5th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943); United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 54
F. Supp. 828, 830 (D. Del. 1944).
35. 328 U.S. at 809 (emphasis added).
36. 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed sub nom. American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
37. 107 F. Supp. at 213-14.
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dants were legal, the court held, the Sherman Act was nonetheless
violated-assuming the plaintiff's allegations were true-on account of
the defendant's illegal purpose."
Just 4 years before the Noerr case, a law review note summarized
the law with regard to concerted efforts to influence legislation as
follows:
[Wihere the inducement of state legislative activity is merely part
of a larger conspiracy to restrain trade or where the lobbyist re-
sorts to measures designed to deceive or corrupt the legislature,
first amendment protection may be withdrawn thereby exposing the
lobbyist to the far reaching provisions of the Sherman Act.
39
Criticism of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The radical departure made in Noerr and Pennington from the
preexisting rule of conspiracy was severely criticized. The reasoning
38. 107 F. Supp. at 214, accord, United States v. Ass'n of Am. R.R., 4 F.R.D.
510 (D. Neb. 1945); cf. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1945).
The court in Slick relied on the American Tobacco case as authority. Slick and Pennsyl-
vania R.R. were cited with approval in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), a case decided after Noerr but before Pennington.
This has led to some confusion as to whether these cases are still good law. However,
it is submitted that Continental can be distinguished. In Continental a subsidiary of
Union Carbide was designated as exclusive purchasing agent of certain valuable metals
for the Canadian government. The Noerr doctrine was not allowed as a defense b-
cause, although the subsidiary was acting for the Canadian Government, it was engaged
in private commercial activity not involving the passage or enforcement of laws. The
Court stated that "acts which are in themselves legal lose that character when they be-
come constituent elements of an unlawful scheme" 370 U.S. at 707.
Slick and Pennsylvania R.R. would seem to be incorrectly used in support of this
proposition in view of the Court's statement regarding a "broader scheme" in Pennington.
See note 32 & accompanying text supra. Perhaps the Continental decision confused the
"bad purpose" doctrine with the "sham exception" in Noerr. See note 20 & accompany-
ing text supra. Or, more likely, the Court probably applied the general rule of Ameri-
can Tobacco because it held the Noerr immunity nonapplicable. At any rate, the Court
caused a great deal of confusion by citing Slick and Pennsylvania R.R. since those cases
involved attempts to influence government. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor
Transport Co. 432 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1970).
However, Pennington, which was decided after Continental, should make it clear
that even when attempts to influence government are part of a broader scheme to re-
strain trade, the action is protected by Noerr unless the conduct falls within the sham
exception. See notes 20 & 33 & accompanying text supra.
39. Note, Attempts to Secure State Legislative Restraints of Competition as a
Violation of the Antitrust Laws, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 82-83 (1957). But see Note,
Appeals to the Electorate by Private Businesses: Injury to Competitors and the Right to
Petition, 70 YALE L.. 135 (1960), another per-Noerr Note which pointed out the haz-
ards of unrestricted lobbying but noted the possible infringement of first amendment
freedoms with restrictions on such activities.
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underlying the Noerr decision has been attacked, 40 and the case has
been denounced as embracing an "unnecessarily restrictive view of
the [Sherman] Act."''1  In a number of cases, it has been observed,
the Supreme Court has recognized valid restrictions on first amend-
ment freedoms where such freedoms were used to effectuate an illegal
purpose.42  One critic has objected to the Noerr Court's inclusion
of so-called "third party techniques" within the scope of first amend-
ment protected freedoms.43
One of the most convincing criticisms of Noerr is set forth in
Professor Jerrold L. Walden's article More About Noerr-Lobbying,
Antitrust and the Right to Petition.44  It is suggested that there may
be strong policy arguments against allowing the first amendment to
protect business groups with anticompetitive motives. During the
early history of this country, Professor Walden points out, there was
vigorous opposition to lobbying, and the Supreme Court condemned
it on occasion.45 As lobbying gradually became accepted as a useful
aid to the legislative process, the number of lobbyists increased46 and
the amount of money expanded in lobbying reached mammoth pro-
40. 33 RocKY MT. L. REv. 413 (1961). The Court used United States. v. Rock
Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 503 (1939), and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943),
to support the proposition that attempts to produce a restraint or monopoly through ef-
forts to influence the course of legislation do not violate the Sherman Act. The Note
points out that these cases held that state legislation in restraint of trade was valid, not
that attempts to procure such legislation did not violate the act.
Although the Note recognizes that Okefenokee Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 214 F.2d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 1954), and American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909), might give some support to the Su-
preme Court's holding in Noerr, it suggests that Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 344 (1904), would give support to a contrary conclusion. But see U. Prrr.
L. REv. 216 (1960).
41. 47 CORNELL L.Q. 250, 255 (1962).
42. Id. at 253. In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498
(1949), the Supreme Court restricted a union's right to picket where the union's purpose
was to get an employer to refrain from selling ice to non-union peddlers. If the em-
ployer had acceded to the union's demand, he would have been guilty of a violation of a
state antitrust statute. The Court said that first amendment freedoms do not grant
immunity to actions or words which encourage the violation of a valid criminal statute.
43. 47 CoNELL L.Q. 250, 255 (1962).
44. 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1211 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Walden].
45. See id. at 121, citing Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441 (1874).
46. Walden, supra note 44, at 1221. Over 1,100 private individuals and organiza-
tions are officially registered in Washington as lobbyists. J. Deakin, THE LoBBYISrS 1
(1966). Another estimate has placed the number of lobbyists currently in Washington
at a minimum of 6,000. McCartney, How Huge Lobby Army Conquers-Unregulated
Corps Score Big Victories in Congress, 108 CoNG. REC. 22970 (1962).
[Vol. 22
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portions.47
Although lobbyists represent a cross section of interests, undoubt-
edly the most powerful and influential group has been that of lobbyists
for the various business interests.48  Few effective controls have been
enacted or enforced to regulate lobbying.49 The result, Professor Wal-
den suggests, has been that "the public interest may be the last to re-
ceive consideration in the enactment of legislation."5 0  He asserts that
Noerr "points in the wrong direction" by extending the first amend-
ment to group lobbying for unlawful purposes. 51 It is suggested
that "there is a vast difference between lobbying, which often mobi-
lizes political and economic pressures, and petitioning which is grounded
in entreaty."
52
Another writer has suggested that attempts to influence govern-
mental bodies other than legislatures should not be protected by the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 3 It has also been asserted that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine should not apply to group attempts to influence
governmental decisions made in an economic rather than political
context. 4
To date, the Supreme Court has been silent on these suggested
limitations of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Since the Noerr deci-
sion, the lower federal courts have consistently extended immunity
to groups utilizing the legislative, executive, judicial or administrative
branches of government to carry out an anticompetitive purpose. 55
Until the Ninth Circuit's decision in Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transport Co.,56 no court called upon to apply the Noerr
doctrine had differentiated between attempts to influence the judiciary
and administrative agencies in furtherance of an anticompetitive
scheme.
57
47. Lobbying has become a "billion dollar business." Walden, supra note 44, at
1223, citing H. R. REP. No. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1950).
48. Id. at 1222.
49. Id. at 1232-49.
50. Id. at 1231.
51. Id. at 1246.
52. Id. at 1243-44.
53. Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66
MicH. L. RaV. 333, 355-56 (1967).
54. Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government
Action, 81 HAiv. L. REv. 847, 858 (1968).
55. See, e.g., Bracken's Shopping Center, Inc. v. Ruwe, 273 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. Ml1.
1967); United States v. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 235 F. Supp. 378, 380-81
(N.D. Cal. 1964); Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
56. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
57. See Association of Western Rys. v. Riss & Co., 299 F.2d 133 (D.C.Cir.),
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Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.
The District Court Decision
In Trucking Unlimited fourteen plaintiffs, each engaged in the
transportation of goods by motor vehicles, brought an action under
sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act58 for treble damages and injunc-
tive relief. Nineteen defendant trucking firms were charged with vio-
lations of section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.59 The defendants
moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. No facts beyond those al-
leged in the original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint
were submitted by either party.
Plaintiffs had alleged in their First Amended Complaint that
since February, 1961, defendants have conspired to put plaintiffs
and their other competitors out of business and for that purpose
have combined their financial and other resources to carry out a
consistent, systematic and uninterrupted program of instituting
through the procedural machinery of the California PUC, the ICC
and of the courts, opposition to every request of application ...
made by plaintiffs or by other competitors of defendants before
such agency, and to appeal any rulings of those agencies to the
courts, all "without probable cause" and "regardless of the merits
of the cases of plaintiffs and defendants' other competitors or of
the merits of defendants' opposition." 60
All common carriers using the public highways are regulated by the
California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) and must secure licenses from these agencies
as a precondition of doing business. 61
It was alleged that the defendants had set up a special trust
fund to finance their program of concerted opposition to license appli-
cations. Contributions were made according to each defendant's yearly
gross income.6 2 Plaintiffs contended that the fund was used not only
to finance opposition to all license applications, requests for reviews,
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 916 (1962); United States v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 259 F.
Supp. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1966); A.B.T. Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. Grey Line N.Y. Tours,
Corp., 242 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R. Co., 196 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.NY 1961) But cf. Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
Amer., 36 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
59. Id. §§ 1-2 (1964).
60. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co. f 72,298 at 84739, rev'd
432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
61. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1061-73; 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1964).
62. 1967 Trade Cas. at 84,740.
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rehearings and appeals made by defendants' competitors, but also to
finance publicity campaigns designed to inform potential competitors
that license applications would encounter vigorous opposition. The
effect of the defendants' activities was to cause those with existing
applications to abandon them and to deter others from making appli-
cations due to the great expense involved.
The defendants contended that the case should be dismissed on
the ground that the activities of which the plaintiffs complained were
protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Judge Sweigert of
the Northern District of California interpreted Noerr and Pennington
to establish the rule that:
[V]iolation of the Sherman Act cannot be predicated upon com-
bined attempts to influence public officials in the enforcement of
laws even when the sole purpose and intent of the persons en-
gaging in such activities is, and the result may be to destroy their
competitors.6 4
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the rule of Noerr and
Pennington applies only to concerted efforts to influence the legislative
and executive branches of government and not to activities intended to
influence the courts or the regulatory agencies.65
The plaintiffs also contended that the defendants' use of the regu-
latory agencies and the courts was a "sham" as the term was used in
Noerr and that the real underlying purpose of the court actions was to
restrain trade and create a monopoly.6 6 The district court disposed
of this contention by pointing out that the plaintiffs did not allege that
all or any of the oppositions were filed without probable cause, and
that some of the oppositions were in fact successful.6"
63. Id.
64. Id. at 84,742.
65. Id. at 84,743. The court cited NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)
as support for the contention that the right of access to courts and regulatory agencies is
a political right, as is the right of access to the legislative and executive branches. It
has been argued that the court used Button improperly as it involved the right of the
state to forbid the solicitation of legal business and not the right to band together to par-
ticipate in adjudicatory proceedings. Note, Antitrust: The Brakes Fail on the Noerr
Doctrine 57 CALIF. L. Rav. 518. 536-42 (1969).
66. 1967 Trade Cas. at 84,743. "There may be situations in which a publicity
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified." Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961) (dictum) (emphasis added).
67. 1967 Trade Cas. at 84,744.
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The plaintiffs relied mainly on a line of patent-antitrust cases6 8
to support their contention that a conspiracy to bring or threaten
suits for the purpose of maintaining monopoly power is a violation of
the antitrust laws. These decisions were interpreted by the district
court as limited to the narrow context of patent cases and hence not
applicable to the Trucking Unlimited case.6"
The Ninth Circuit Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on two
grounds:
(1) First, concerted employment of judicial and administrative
processes as part of a scheme to restrain trade . . . is not ex-
cluded from the Sherman Act by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
(2) Second, even if the Noerr-Pennington rule does apply to the
use of judicial and administrative adjudicative processes in a
scheme to restrain trade, relief is not barred if . . .the real pur-
pose of defendants' joint activity was to restrain competitors di-
rectly, rather than to restrain them indirectly by inducing restrictive
governmental action. 70
To justify excluding joint efforts to influence the judiciary and
administrative agencies from the protection of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, Judge Browning pointed out that it is not the function of the
courts or administrative agencies to "determine whether laws restrain-
ing trade will be adopted or. . .whether such laws will be enforced."'"
Several patent cases7 2 and the Slick Airways case,"m a pre-Noerr deci-
sion, were cited as authority for this proposition.
The court also decided that the defendants' alleged activites fell
within the "sham" exception of the Noerr case.1 4  It was determined
that the defendants' real purpose was not to induce action by govern-
mental agencies but to preclude such action by opposing all applica-
68. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe v.
Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
69. 1967 Trade Cas. at 84,746.
70. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 757 (9th
Cir. 1970), rev'g 1967 Trade Cas. 72,298 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
71. Id. at 758 (emphasis added).
72. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe, Inc. v. Demp-
sey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424-25 (10th Cir. 1952); Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d
883 (9th Cir. 1938).
73. Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 213-14
(D. N.J. 1951), appeal dismissed sub nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d
230 (3d Cir. 1953). See notes 38 & accompanying text supra.
74. 432 F.2d at 761-63. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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tions with the PUC or ICC by competitors and by encouraging com-
petitors not to make applications. 75  This conduct, it was held, con-
stituted a direct restraint of trade, as distinguished from an indirect
restraint of trade through governmental action. Only the latter is pro-
tected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
7 6
Judge Hamlin dissented, stating that the PUC was governed by a
broad statutory standard that give it powers closely akin to legisla-
tive policy making powers. Hence, he argued, the Noerr-Pennington
immunity should apply, and the plaintiff's sole remedy should lie in the
good judgment of the PUC.
77
Inducement of Judicial or Administrative Action
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine should not apply in cases where
the defendants' concerted activities are designed to induce anticompeti-
tive judicial or administrative adjudicative action, the court concluded,
because:
The fundamental reason for the Noerr-Pennington exception does
not apply. It is not the function of the courts to determine whether
laws restraining trade will be adopted or, having been adopted,
whether they will be enforced; nor is this the function of an admin-
istrative agency engaged in adjudication, as the PUC and the ICC
are here. It would be pointless to limit the reach of the Sherman
Act in order to protect the access of courts and agencies engaged
in adjudicative functions to information and opinion relevant to
determinations which they have no power to make.78
The proposition that it is not the "function" of the courts and the
quasi-judicial administrative agencies to adopt or enforce laws7 9 raises
certain difficulties. It is almost too obvious for statement that the
courts, at least, make law. For example, the Sherman Act is silent as
to what specific practices are forbidden, but the courts have interpreted
the act to prohibit price fixing,80 allocation of territories among com-
petitors,8 1 resale price maintenance s2 and group boycotts.8" It is also
clear that the courts have ultimate responsibility for deciding which
laws are constitutional and should be enforced.8 4
75. Id. at 762.
76. See id. at 763.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 758-59.
79. Id. at 758.
80. E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
81. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
82. E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
83. E.g, KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
84. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Administrative agencies, as well as the courts, exercise policy-
making powers. The Trucking Unlimited court was careful to limit
the non-applicability of the Noerr-Pennington defense to concerted
attempts to influence administrative adjudicative processes.85 In so
doing, the court made an important distinction. Many agencies have
quasi-legislative powers which may be exercised in a rule-making
capacity. When an administrative agency is acting in such a capacity,
the rationale of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would seem to apply.
To restrict access to administrative agencies exercising quasi-legisla-
tive, as opposed to adjudicative powers, might well constitute an
abridgement of the right to petition and would tend to deprive the
agency of a valuable source of information.
Drawing the line between adjudicative administrative processes
and quasi-legislative functions may not be an easy task at times. The
Ninth Circuit carefully tried to distinguish the fact situation concerning
TVA in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.8" It was
held in Pennington that attempts to persuade TVA officials to cur-
tail spot market purchases, a policy which would injure the plaintiffs,
were protected by the Noerr doctrine. TVA acts as an administrative
agency in many of its functions,17 but the Ninth Circuit pointed out
that the decisions sought to be influenced in Pennington were not ad-
judicatory in nature.88
The cases cited by the Ninth Circuit as authority for removing
Noerr-Pennington immunity from concerted attempts to influence
judicial or administrative adjudicative action are all patent-antitrust
cases (with the exception of the pre-Noerr Slick Airways cases).8 9
In each of these cases some illegal use of patents was involved, such as
a cross-licensing agreement with competitors, an unlawful patent pool,
or fraudulent procurement of the patent.
The first case cited by the court is Walker Process Equipment,
85. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir.
1970).
86. 381 U.S. 657.
87. For instance, TVA has the power to award contracts. 16 U.S.C. § 831h(b)
(1964) provides in part: "[I]n comparing bids and making awards the Board may
consider such factors as relative quality and adaptability of supplies or services, the bid-
der's financial responsibility, skill, experience, record of integrity in dealing, ability to
furnish repair and maintenance services .... "
88. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 759 n.5
(1970).
89. It is submitted that Slick Airways is no longer good law. At the very least,
it would seem distinguishable. See note 38 supra.
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Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp.90 There the defen-
dant's amended counterclaim to a patent infringement suit charged
the plaintiff with monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. It was alleged that the plaintiff had "illegally monopolized
interstate and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith ob-
taining and maintaining.., its patent... well knowing that it had
no basis for . . .a patent."'" The district court dismissed the coun-
terclaim, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that "the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud
on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act pro-
vided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.
92
In Trucking Unlimited, Judge Browning cited Walker for the
broad proposition that "the Sherman Act is violated by a conspiracy
to unreasonably restrain or monopolize trade through the use of judi-
cial and administrative adjudicative proceedings. '93  Walker clearly
does not go that far; it merely says that a patent holder violates section
2 when he instutes suit to enforce a patent which he knows was ob-
tained by intentional fraud on the Patent Office. It would seem that
the patent holder in a case like Walker commits the crime of perjury
and compounds a fraud by his very act of filing an infringement suit.
His claim to Noerr-Pennington protection is therefore considerably
weaker than that of the defendants in Trucking Unlimited, whose re-
sort to the courts and the agencies was in many instances supported
by probable cause, was not alleged to have been fraudulent, and could
therefore be illegal only because of the defendants' ulterior anticom-
petitive purpose.
In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,94 the Justice De-
partment sued to restrain Singer, the sole American manufacturer of
"zigzag" sewing machines, from conspiring to restrain trade. It was
alleged that Singer conspired with an Italian and a Swiss manufacturer
to exclude Japanese competition from the American market through
cross-licensing agreements, patent assignments, infringement actions
and proceedings before the United States Tariff Commission.95 The
Supreme Court ruled that although it is not unlawful to use a patent to
90. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
91. Id. at 174.
92. Id.
93. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755, 759 (9th
Cir. 1970).
94. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
95. Id. at 176-88.
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exclude competitors, 96 the conspiracy to eliminate competition by
assigning to Singer the duty of maintaining the oligopoly of the three
parties through infringement suits and Tariff Commission proceedings
constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.97  Although
the Noerr defense 98 was not specifically discussed, it was apparent
that defendants were relying on the proposition that everything they
did was within the law. However, it cannot be said that the defen-
dants' scheme, apart from the illegal enforcement plan, was entirely
lawful since they were enforcing an illegal cross-licensing agreement.99
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.'00 was an action for patent
infringement. The defendants counterclaimed charging abuse of the
patent monopoly in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Shortly after the defendant introduced its pump into the market, the
plaintiff brought suit alleging that no one could build a pump without
infringing its patents.?10  The plaintiff sent letters to major pur-
chasers of pumps telling of the infringement suit.10 2  The court, how-
ever, found evidence of an illegal patent pool'03 and awarded damages
to the defendant on its counterclaim:
We fully recognize that free and unrestricted access to the courts
should not be denied or imperiled in any manner. At the same
time we must not permit the courts to be a vehicle for maintaining
and carrying out an unlawful monopoly which has for its purpose
the elimination and prevention of competition.'
04
It was held that the infringement action and other activites were not
in themselves illegal, but "when considered with the entire monopolistic
scheme . . . they may be considered as having been done to give ef-
fect to the unlawful scheme."'1 5  The American Tobacco case was
cited as authority. But under the Noerr doctrine, the rule of the
American Tobacco case does not apply in a Noerr-type situation. 10 6
Moreover, Pennington made clear that Noerr-type activities, even when
part of a "broader scheme," do not violate the Sherman Act.'
0 7
96. Id. at 189.
97. Id. at 195.
98. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
99. 374 U.S. at 177-79.
100. 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952).
101. Id. at 421-22.
102. Id. at 422.
103. Id. at 419-20.
104. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 425.
106. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
107. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). See also note 33 &
accompanying text supra.
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Perhaps Dempsey could be explained on the basis that the plaintiffs
there sued to enforce an illegal patent pool. It might also be inter-
preted as a "sham exception" case.108  But the most plausible ex-
planation of Dempsey seems to be that it rested on the pre-Noerr
"bad purpose" doctrine, which was expressly rejected by Noerr and
Pennington. °9 It might well be concluded, therefore, that Noerr and
Pennington impliedly overruled much of the language in Dempsey.
Lynch v. Magnavox" ° was another pre-Noerr case cited by the
court in Trucking Unlimited. There the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants conspired to monopolize the manufacture, sale and distri-
bution of radio loud speakers in interstate commerce. Under the con-
spiracy, competitors allegedly cross-licensed each other illegally,
threated infringement suits to discourage others from manufacturing,
and actually instituted a number of suits.' An extensive letter-
writing campaign to retail outlets was carried on to discourage the sale
of competitive products."' The district court sustained the demurrer.
The appellate court reversed, holding that "[i]f the purpose was unlaw-
ful, there is a violation.""' 3  This is clearly an articulation of the old
"bad purpose" doctrine. Therefore Lynch was also impliedly over-
ruled by Pennington, although the case might still be good law as re-
spects use of illegal cross-licensing agreements among competitors to
create a monopoly.
In none of the foregoing patent-antitrust cases did the courts hold
that a conspiracy actuated by anticompetitive motives, to bring or to
threaten to bring an infringement suit was, without more, an antitrust
violation. In fact, it has long been recognized that the mere bringing
of an infringement suit with the intent to monopolize the industry does
not constitute a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act." 4  A
contrary rule would amount to an acceptance of the old bad purpose
doctrine, which was decisively rejected in Pennington. Hence it is
clear that the holding in Trucking Unlimited rests on a paucity of
precedent.
108. See notes 20 & 102 & accompanying text supra (letters to purchasers telling
of suit).
109. See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
110. 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938).
111. Id. at 886-87.
112. Id. at 887.
113. Id. at 890.
114. See International Visible Sys. Corp. v. Remington-Rand, 65 F.2d 540, 542
(6th Cir. 1933); accord Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. 227 U.S. 8, 38 (1912).
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Sham Exception
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the "sham exception" clears
up the district court's confusion on this subject.' 15 Although the de-
fendants sought to influence official action by intervening in Public
Utilities Commission hearings to oppose the issuance of operating cer-
tificates, their real objective was to deter other truckers' applications.
They publicized their intention to oppose all new applications to in-
fluence competitors' conduct, not the government's. If the plan had
worked perfectly, there would have been no applications and hence no
need for the defendants to appear before the PUC or the courts. To
this extent, the defendant truckers sought to restrain trade directly by
means other than influencing governmental action and were not sub-
ject to Noerr-Pennington immunity. "16
One difficulty in this approach lies in the fact that defendants did
make a genuine effort to induce governmental action. Many of the
oppositions to the issuance of new licenses were in fact successful." 7
However, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the fact that a valid basis
existed for opposing some applications was irrelevant since all applica-
tions were to be opposed regardless of merit.
118
Conclusion
Judge Browning limited the decision in Trucking Unlimited to
subject only those groups that use the judicial and administrative ad-
judicative processes for restraining trade to Sherman Act liability." 9
The courts have held that the PUC acts as both a quasi-legislative and
an adjudicative body.12 1 In performing the licensing function, the
PUC is exercising its adjudicative powers unless it is formulating a
115. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 1967 Trade Cas. %
72,298 (N.D. Cal. 1967), rev'd, 432 F.2d 755. See note 79 & accompanying text supra.
116. 432 F.2d at 763.
117. See note 71 & accompanying text supra.
118. Id.
119. Adjudicative matters have been defined as "facts about the parties and their
activities, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions
of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts
are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not
usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal de-
cide questions of law and policy and discretion." I K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958).
120. People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 42 Cal. 2d 621, 630-32, 268 P.2d 723, 728-
29, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166
Cal. 640, 650, 137 P. 1119, 1121-22 (1913).
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general policy. The defendants in Trucking Unlimited did not attempt
to induce the PUC to change its general policy. Instead, they at-
tempted to influence the PUC's adjudicative decisions for anticompe-
titive reasons. It is submitted that such activities should not be pro-
tected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
It has been suggested that the broad language of Noerr and
Pennington should be- limited. 21 Justice Black argued in Noerr that
the Sherman Act was not meant to regulate political activity.'
However, the Sherman Act was intended to regulate economic ac-
tivity. It follows that those who conspire to restrain trade by attempting
to influence purely economic decisions of governmental decision-mak-
ing agencies should be subject to Sherman Act prosecution. As one
recent law review article put it:
In determining the applicability of the Sherman Act to interest
groups attempting to influence government decisions, the court
should focus on the criteria which properly form the basis of the
influenced decision. If the decision is essentially political,
grounded in considerations which transcend economic data, invo-
cation of the Sherman Act would be inapposite. However, when
the decision is best made in an economic context, reliance on the
Sherman Act would promote its goal of reducing the number of
anticompetitive restraints in the economy without imposing upon
the operation of the political process.12 3
This thesis is not without support in the case law. Woods Ex-
ploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America- 24 makes the
distinction between political and economic decisions. In this case, suit
was brought against oil and gas leaseholders by competitors for treble
damages and injunctive relief. The defendants' motion for summary
judgment was denied by the district court.J25  In support of their
motion to dismiss, defendants argued that no violation of the antitrust
laws had been stated. It was argued that defendants' attempt to in-
fluence the Railroad Commission by filing allegedly false "nomina-
tions" 26 to restrict the production of oil by competitors was pro-
121. See Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense,
66 MxcH. L. REv. 333, 356 (1967). See also Walden, More About Noerr-Lobbying,
Antitrust and the Right to Petition, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1211, 1249 (1967), where it is
suggested that the Sherman Act be utilized to prevent horizontal combinations of large
competitors with common legislative programs.
122. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
123. Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government
Action, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 847, 858 (1968).
124. 36 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
125. Id. at 109, 113.
126. "Nominations" are predictions of the amount of natural gas that could be pro-
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tected by the Noerr doctrine. 12 7
The court rejected the argument, saying that Noerr probably did
not apply because the actions complained of were not essentially
political in nature. 2 ' However, the point is somewhat weakened by
the court's further statement that even if this activity were protected
by Noerr, the plaintiffs had alleged other facts sufficient to preclude dis-
missal. 2 9
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
should apply to concerted efforts to influence governmental decisions of
an essentially political nature. However, when the decision sought to
be influenced is basically "adjudicatory," the full power of the Sher-
man Act should be exerted. This is especially true when the conduct
is part of a larger plan which seeks directly to restrain trade.
Alan H. Melnicoe*
duced in the coming month. Producers of natural gas were required by law to file such
"nominations" in order for the Railroad Commission to determine if new wells were
needed. Id. at 112.
127. Id. at 111.
128. Id. at 111-12.
129. Id. at 112. The Woods case was recently affirmed, 39 U.S.L.W. 2413 (U.S.
Feb. 2, 1971). The Fifth Circuit cited Trucking Unlimited as authority.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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